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I 
INTRODUCTION 
When healthcare reform was being debated in the United States last year, 
many groups—including members of Congress, White House representatives, 
and other public and private policy groups—attempted to hold and facilitate 
“town hall” meetings to demonstrate how ADR-like processes, such as 
deliberative democracy and consensus building, could be used to encourage 
deliberative consideration of healthcare proposals. Instead of model 
deliberative sessions, however, most of these sessions turned adversarial (and 
were then subverted for more “interrupted” democracy), as they were 
“sabotaged” by opponents of national healthcare reform. This paper reflects on 
the deliberative democracy and consensus building literature that suggests how 
less-adversarial processes might be used to achieve good policy making and 
contrasts the theory with what actually happened in practice last year. How 
does our theory and practice of deliberative democracy have to change to 
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actually be effective? Was what happened peculiar to healthcare policy making, 
or are there lessons to learn generally for deliberative democracy theory and 
practice? 
When President Barack Obama was elected in 2008, hopes were high for 
substantive reform in several important domestic arenas—most prominently, 
healthcare, labor law, immigration, and education, along with efforts to deal 
with the economic recession.1 Shortly after his election, several bloggers and 
fellow dispute resolution activists suggested that “we” should advise the 
President to make use of our “new” field of consensus building, facilitated 
deliberative democracy, public fora for policy making, and various dialogue 
techniques to engage the public in participating in these reforms.2 
Deliberative democracy is both a political theory3 and a practice that has 
built upon insights from the conflict resolution movement of the 1980s.4 The 
modern ADR (“Alternative” or, more commonly now, “Appropriate” Dispute 
Resolution) movement was born of dissatisfaction with the high-cost, inefficient 
dispute processing and unnecessarily brittle or binary solutions of the 
conventional legal system and courts. At about the same time, deliberative 
democracy ideas were birthed out of dissatisfaction with similarly polarized and 
inefficient decision making in our political system. Yet, as these two social 
movements (ADR and deliberative democracy) have attempted to deal with 
similar issues and processes, they have offered slightly different rationales and 
practices, with important consequences for what recently occurred in the 
“failed” town-hall meetings about healthcare reform. 
 
 1. Of course, hopes were also high for more deliberation (and changes in policy) on the conduct 
of the two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 2. I advised against this on the dispute resolution listserv because I thought it was unnecessary 
and paternalistic of us to suggest such things to a master community organizer and student of mediation 
while at Harvard Law School. I knew that the new President-elect was quite aware of consensus-
building and mediative techniques. The White House soon began a public comment and a public 
deliberation space on its website, whitehouse.gov: the OFFICE OF PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT BLOG, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ope/blog (last visited Jan. 15, 2011), and the OPEN 
GOVERNMENT INITIATIVE BLOG, http://www.whitehouse.gov/open/blog (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). 
There is now also healthcare.gov to provide information (and elicit questions, comments, and stories) 
on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119. 
 3. For analysis of deliberative democracy as a political theory, see generally JAMES BOHMAN, 
PUBLIC DELIBERATION: PLURALISM, COMPLEXITY, AND DEMOCRACY (1996); DEBATING 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (James S. Fishkin & Peter Laslett eds., 2003); DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK: STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY (John Gastil & Peter Levine eds., 2005); DELIBERATIVE POLITICS: ESSAYS ON 
DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (Stephen Macedo ed., 1999); JOHN S. DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND: LIBERALS, CRITICS, CONTESTATIONS (2000); ARCHON FUNG & ERIK 
OLIN WRIGHT, DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED 
PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE (2003); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISAGREEMENT (1996). 
 4. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Deliberative Democracy and Conflict Resolution: Two Theories and 
Practices of Participation in the Polity, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2006, at 18; Symposium, Raising the 
Bar: What Deliberative Democracy Means for Dispute Resolution, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2006, at 
1, 5–27 (first section of issue titled Focus: Deliberative Democracy, presenting several illuminating 
articles on the subject). 
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In this article, I explore the rationales and practices of deliberative 
democracy and conflict resolution as they were enacted in the so-called town-
hall meetings5 about healthcare in the United States in 2009 and offer my 
analysis of what went wrong and why. The failure to adapt old conceptions of 
town-hall meetings to modern political realities in the healthcare-reform battles 
cautions us to reconceptualize both theory and practice as we try to “scale up” 
conflict resolution methods for larger, highly conflictual disputes at the societal, 
not individual, level. At its core, my argument is that naïve political and 
philosophical theories about the use of “reason” in democratic deliberation fail 
to take adequate account of two other major modes of modern discourse: 
bargaining and affective (involving emotion and ethical, religious, or strongly 
held values) or feeling-based arguments. If dispute resolution techniques based 
on ADR principles of focusing on parties’ needs, interests, and underlying 
values are to be used for major policy decisions aiming to increase polity 
participation in decisions affecting the lives of all, then those techniques (and 
the theories on which they are based) may require some adaptation to large-
scale moments of deliberation and decision making. At the conclusion of this 
article, I offer some suggestions for both reconceiving and restructuring such 
processes for different kinds of uses for different kinds of issues. 
II 
THEORIES OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
Modern deliberative democracy theories derive mostly from the work of 
social and political philosopher Jürgen Habermas, particularly from his work on 
“ideal speech conditions” for fair deliberation on political decisions affecting 
those governed by the decisions made.6 Like many similar theorists who 
“privilege” reason, Habermas argues that under certain conditions of equality, 
fairness, and “uncoerced” speech, decisions should be made on the basis of 
persuasion with all interested parties able to argue for their “positions.”7 No 
decision should be adopted unless all those affected by a decision have an 
opportunity to persuade each other. Habermas, like others who have theorized 
about public-participation models of communication,8 is, in fact, quite optimistic 
about the ability of rational suasion to persuade even those with differing values 
to come to an agreement. Notions of rational persuasion assume openness to 
 
 5. The most basic critique of these so-called town-hall meetings is that they were not “town halls” 
at all because they were often addressed to much larger groups (whole congressional constituencies, 
rather than towns or smaller communities) and because they were not really deliberative or decision-
making events—they were convened to persuade people to support particular policy choices, more or 
less already made. 
 6. 1 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE 
RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 177 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984). 
 7. Id. at 179. 
 8. E.g., BOHMAN, supra note 3, at 23–25; DRYZEK, supra note 3, at 47–55. See generally 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (John Elster ed., 1998) (presenting various contributions supporting 
decision by discussion or deliberation as an alternative to voting in political decision making). 
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hearing other points of view. This assumption did not seem to hold true 
empirically at the healthcare events, however, for “both” sides appeared to 
attend with the intent either to persuade people to support the Administration’s 
healthcare proposals or to defeat those proposals—with both sides delivering 
various forms of “one-way lectures,” rather than participatory and attentive 
conversations. At the outset, these events were not structured as true policy-
deliberation or decision-making events. Rather, they were designed to 
persuade—or, at the very best, to educate about what the Administration had 
already proposed—or to disrupt both the events themselves and the policy-
adoption (legislative) process. 
Many theorists who recognize the complexity and difficulty of highly 
charged issues—like abortion, gun control, immigration policy, animal rights, 
discrimination, AIDS and HIV treatment, gay marriage, and war policy—are 
still hopeful that under proper conditions, those with very different views can 
come together and, under the right conditions,9 can deliberate with each other, 
becoming better informed (and, even occasionally, changing their views);10 
reach decisions by voting, consensus building,11 or preference trading 
(negotiation); or, at the very least, come to understand each other better12 with 
“recognition” and perhaps also enhanced feelings of “self-empowerment.”13 
Deliberative democracy is intended to have many goals: identifying issues 
for policy development; sifting, choosing, and modifying policy; and sometimes 
actually facilitating decision making on behalf of various levels of political and 
legal action. Who defines the goals of any particular deliberative democracy 
“event” is an important theoretical and practical issue. The goals of the 
healthcare town halls were somewhat simplistically or amorphously defined—
did government representatives seek to persuade members of the public to 
support whatever plans were in the offing at the time (May through September 
2009), or were officials really open to hearing about new ideas and amendments 
to various proposed bills? On the opposition side, objectives ranged from defeat 
of any administration proposed plan to more specific opposition. In one sense, 
the town halls were not a “failure” from the perspective of the oppositionists—
 
 9. E.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 4–5 (2004); GUTMANN & 
THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 7–8, 55, 95. At the Duke Law See You Out of Court? The Role of ADR in 
Healthcare symposium, Nancy Dubler expressed doubt that matters of “life and death” could ever be 
deliberated rationally, especially in very large groups. Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Professor Emerita, 
Albert Einstein Coll. of Med., Yeshiva Univ., Commentary at the Duke Law and Contemporary 
Problems Symposium: See You Out of Court? The Role of ADR in Healthcare (Oct. 8, 2010). 
 10. JAMES S. FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC 
CONSULTATION 161–69 (2009). 
 11. See generally, e.g., SUSAN L. CARPENTER & W.J.D. KENNEDY, MANAGING PUBLIC DISPUTES: 
A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, AND CITIZENS’ GROUPS (2d ed. 2001); THE 
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999). 
 12. For examples of dialogue models to assist in facilitating this result, see PUBLIC 
CONVERSATIONS PROJECT, http://www.publicconversations.org (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). 
 13. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: THE 
TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT 55–56 (rev. ed. 2005). 
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the public option was removed from the bill that finally became law. Actually, 
the wide media coverage of the events probably gave the oppositionists further 
voice by covering the more dramatic moments of contest and confrontation, 
raising important questions about media coverage and transparency or 
confidentiality in deliberative events. 
Several other important, recent theorists express more realistic (some would 
say pessimistic) notions about our ability to rationally deliberate and reach 
decisions about “the good.” In his Tanner Lectures, social philosopher Stuart 
Hampshire suggested that, after a full life of theorizing about the substantive 
“good,” he had come to realize that in our modern, diverse societies (including 
value, as well as demographic, diversities), we were unlikely to come to any true 
agreement on “the good.”14 Therefore, at the end of a long and productive 
career in moral philosophy, he concluded that we were more likely to come to 
some agreements—not on “the good,” but on procedures for arguing about 
what policy outcomes we could actually accomplish. In his book, Justice Is 
Conflict, Hampshire suggested that the Anglo-American mode of adversary 
argument audi alterum partem, or “hear the other side,” could eventually be 
made an almost universal procedure of fairness and good decision making if we 
could really give adequate voice and truly listen to the other side.15 
In a variety of venues, I have both praised and criticized this basic idea of 
the universal value of proceduralism and fairness by suggesting that more 
modern theories of deliberative democracy and conflict resolution, which 
involve multiple issues and many “parties,” should be modified to say, “Hear 
[and understand] all the other sides.”16 This might also entail some “process 
pluralism” (or a greater diversity of procedures, not just adversary argument). 
Concern for fair process or “procedural justice”17 might be universal, but what 
process is considered fair might indeed vary in different circumstances. 
Hampshire did not fully explore these scenarios, but they certainly remain a 
concern for all dispute resolution scholars18 and the new practical field of 
dispute-system design.19 
 
 14. STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT 33–34 (2000). This work is based on arguments 
Hampshire first delivered in Justice Is Conflict: The Soul and the City, The Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values, Delivered at Harvard University (Oct. 30–31, 1996) (transcript available at http:// 
www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/Hampshire98.pdf). 
 15. Id. at 8–9 (2000). 
 16. E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and Purposes of Legal 
Processes, 94 GEO. L.J. 553, 557 (2006). 
 17. See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE (1988) (providing theory and research on procedural justice and exploring its social 
implications). 
 18. E.g., CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE 
ADVERSARIAL MODEL 581–633 (2d ed. 2011). See also THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
(Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 2000); THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
(Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005). 
 19. E.g., Symposium, Dispute Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
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Modern conflicts and disputes actually often involve multiple parties and 
multiple “sides” to be heard (despite their characterization as either Republican 
or Democratic, conservative or liberal, and red or blue20). Polarization of most 
political issues, but especially healthcare, makes gradations and variations of 
views and policy outcomes impossible to recognize and discuss because voting 
and other political procedures ultimately require binary decisions: yes or no. 
Although courts must usually come to win or lose binary solutions, true 
deliberation before the fact of legislation or regulation could actually permit 
more nuanced policy outcomes; yet, in fact, modern American political 
behaviors have tended to make the legislative and regulatory processes more 
oppositional and adversarial.21 One essential question was whether there were 
“multiple” issues to be traded or bargained for or only a “single” issue of 
support for healthcare (as the Administration proposed). Similarly, to the 
extent that healthcare became a single (and “signaling”) issue of support for the 
larger political regime, it was not “nested” in the many other issues that could 
have been deliberated and perhaps traded. The healthcare town halls failed to 
explore basic principles of complex voting issues (such as simple-majority, 
super-majority, and Condorcet-preference voting)22 and multiple-issue trading, a 
staple of consensus-building procedures. These failures made it virtually 
impossible for the town-hall meetings to affect policy outcomes (which is not 
what they seemed to be designed to do). 
Like Hampshire, economist-turned-social philosopher Amartya Sen has also 
recently suggested we need a turn to more realistic political philosophy and 
policy-choice practices.23 Because the “perfect can be the enemy of the good,”24 
quests for universal theories of political justice, such as John Rawls’ classic 
efforts for a “veil of ignorance,”25 prevent us from more realizable “second best” 
 
 20. E.g., Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized 
Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Public Law 
Research Paper No. 10-47, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1646989; Sam Tanenhaus, The 
Myth of Consensus Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/10/24/books/review/Tanenhaus-t.html. 
 21. E.g., ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 188 
(2001) (“The United States . . . strives to subject the political struggle over regulatory policy to the 
constraints of legal rationality, which gives both regulated business and proregulation advocacy groups 
yet another set of weapons to foil regulatory decisions that they may dislike.”). 
 22. See MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 18, at 585–86; AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF 
JUSTICE 92 (2009) (describing French social-choice theorist Condorcet’s demonstration that majority 
rule can be thoroughly inconsistent—the “Condorcet Paradox”); LEIGH L. THOMSON, THE MIND AND 
HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR 222–24 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing voting issues and paradoxes). 
 23. SEN, supra note 22, at 194–207, 225. See generally Cesar Arjona, Arif Jamal, Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Victor Ramraj & Francisco Satiro, Senses of Sen, 7 INT’L J.L. IN CONTEXT (forthcoming 
2011). 
 24. The original quote in French is “Le mieux est l’ennemi du bien.” VOLTAIRE, 2 DICTIONNAIRE 
PHILOSOPHIQUE 49 (Lebigre Freres ed., 1834) (originally appearing in Voltaire’s poem, La Bégueule 
(1772)). The literal translation is “The best is the enemy of good,” THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF 
QUOTATIONS 797 (Elizabeth Knowles ed., 5th ed. 1999) (quotation number 11), but the more common 
translation is “The perfect is the enemy of the good.” 
 25. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118–23 (1999). 
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injustice reduction efforts when we debate universal and unrealizable “justice.” 
Sen suggests we look at more varieties of experiments on the ground—with 
empirical data and evaluation—searching for attempts to reduce poverty, 
disease, war, and the aftermaths of natural (as well as man-made) disasters.26 
One size will not fit all, these philosophers caution, in substance or in 
procedure. Rather than seeking impossible “transcendental” solutions to a 
myriad of human problems and suffering, Sen suggests we should seek 
“comparative broadening” by looking more at how other systems deal with 
similar problems (such as socialized medicine—“horrors” to many Americans, 
but not to a large part of the rest of the world—and different models of 
agriculture and food distribution).27 And, he suggests, there could be a “plurality 
of sustainable reasons” (instead of a single train of rational thought) for making 
policy choices.28 In his recent book, Sen traces more (nonwestern) sources of 
models for political decision making, in both process and possible choices of 
action, especially in situations of extreme human devastation—for example, 
poverty, floods and other natural disasters, and starvation (which he sees as 
maldistribution and mismanagement of resource problems).29 These situations 
require much experimentation (rather than uniform or unitary solutions), as 
well as different models of management, and then empirical evaluation, along 
with public (and expert) deliberation. 
These more modern “social realist” philosophers continue that other Adam 
Smithian tradition—not that of the economistic “hand of the free market” 
Wealth of Nations,30 but rather the Theory of Moral Sentiments,31 in which Smith 
explores both our altruistic and fellow feeling proclivities. He also identifies a 
need for an “impartial spectator” to measure what we think and do against the 
evaluative criteria of some outsider who can encourage “critical scrutiny and 
public discussion” and expose when we are making assumptions about our own 
insular needs and wants.32 In this, Smith and Sen may be on to something very 
important about modern deliberative democracy—a theoretical justification for 
the practical “third-party neutral” or skilled deliberative democracy facilitator, 
mediator, or moderator. 
Notable political philosopher Jon Elster has looked at constitutional 
processes and outcomes and, in a now-classic study of comparative 
constitutionalism, has also described his own version of the perfect as the 
 
 26. SEN, supra note 22, at 16–17. 
 27. Id. at 400–07. 
 28. Id. at 225–35. 
 29. Id. at 323. 
 30. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
(Edwin Cannan ed., 6th ed. 1904). 
 31. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 
1976). 
 32. Id. at 32. 
MENKEL-MEADOW 3/25/2011   
8 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 74:1 
enemy of the good.33 Elster argues that France’s constitutional formation 
processes, which were based on first principles of transparency, publicity, and 
plenary participation, resulted in a highly fractious and politicized process.34 
This led to many regime changes (not to mention killings of revolutionary 
leaders, all in the name of the great abstract and universal values of fraternité, 
equalité, and liberté) and constitutional instability. In contrast, the American 
constitutional-formation process in the same era was characterized by secrecy, 
committee (not plenary) work, and infamously compromised (not principled) 
solutions to divisive issues—for example, the continuation of slavery and a 
nondemocratic Senate, as well as the problematic, indirect election of 
presidents and appointment of senators).35 Nevertheless, even with a brutal civil 
war and over twenty-five amendments, the U.S. Constitution has had a longer 
and more robust life than France’s more “principled” constitution. From this, 
Elster concludes that process matters and that processes are complicated to 
structure and manage, depending on the outcomes sought (goals) and those 
actually achieved (outputs or consequences).36 
From this and other work Elster has done on the affective dimension of the 
role of emotion in democratic processes,37 it is apparent that true deliberation 
needs to take account of the process pluralism produced by conflict resolution 
theory’s focus on underlying needs and interests, and at least three separate 
modes of human discourse: the principled-rational, the bargaining or preference-
trading (negotiation), and the affective and value-feeling, recognizing the 
importance of the emotional dimensions of discourse. For ease of discussion, 
Table 1 demonstrates how these different modes of human discourse, coupled 
with different forms of decision making required in different contexts, produce 
a broader and wider dimension of possible processes to be used in public-policy 
deliberation than what occurred in the healthcare debates.38 
 
 33. Jon Elster, Strategic Uses of Argument, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 236, 244–52 
(Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995). 
 34. Id. at 242, 244. 
 35. See generally Dana Lanksy, Proceeding to a Constitution: A Multi-Party Negotiation Analysis of 
the Constitutional Convention of 1787, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 279 (2000) (presenting the Framers’ 
successful negotiations as an illustration of how deliberative process can be used creatively to solve 
complex, multi-party issues); Jack N. Rakove, The Great Compromise: Ideas, Interests, and the Politics 
of Constitution Making, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 424 (1987) (describing the Federal Convention’s process 
of deliberation over whether to give states an equal vote in the Senate). 
 36. Elster, supra note 33, at 257. 
 37. E.g., JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND: RATIONALITY AND THE EMOTIONS (1999). 
 38. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Introduction: From Legal Disputes to Conflict Resolution and 
Human Problem Solving, in DISPUTE PROCESSING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION xi, at xxxi (2003) 
(presenting similar version of this table). 
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Table 1: Modes of Conflict Resolution 
MODE OF 
DISCOURSE 
PRINCIPLES BARGAINING PASSIONS 
FORM OF 
PROCESS: 
   
Closed Some court 
proceedings; 
arbitration 
Negotiation—U.S. 
Constitution; 
diplomacy 
Mediation (for example, 
divorce) 
Open French Constitution; 
courts; arbitration 
Public negotiations; 
some labor 
Dialogue movement 
Plenary French Constitution Reg-Neg (Negotiated 
Rulemaking) 
Town-hall meetings 
Committees Faculty committees; 
task groups 
U.S. Constitution; U.S. 
Congress 
Caucuses; interest groups 
Expert–
Facilitator 
Consensus building Mini-trial Public conversations 
Naturalistic   Grassroots organizing; 
WTO protests 
Permanent Government; 
institutions 
Business organizations; 
unions 
Religious organizations; 
Alcoholics Anonymous; 
Weight Watchers 
Constitutive UN; national 
constitutions 
National constitutions; 
professional 
associations 
Civil justice movements; 
peace 
Temporary or 
Ad hoc 
Issue organizations; 
social justice 
Interest groups Yippies; New Age; 
vigilantes 
 
Principles = reasons, appeals to universalism, law 
Bargaining = interests, preferences, trading, compromises 
Passions = needs, emotions, religion 
 
Closed = confidential, secret process or outcomes (settlements) 
Open = public or transparent meetings or proceedings 
 
Plenary = full group participation, joint meetings 
Committees = task groups, caucuses, parts of the whole 
 
Expert–facilitator = led by expertise (process or substantive or both) 
Naturalistic = leaderless, grassroots, ad hoc 
 
Permanent = organizational, institutional 
Constitutive = constitutional 
Temporary = ad hoc groups or disputants 
 
Some predicted effects of process on outcome: 
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1. Closed (confidential) proceedings are open to vulnerability, inviting 
more honest and candid expression of interests, needs, and 
passions; more “trades”; and less posturing. 
2. Open (transparent) proceedings require more principled or 
reasoned justifications, producing more rigidity. 
This table places town-hall meetings in the third column. Organized in 
plenary form, these meetings appeal to basic emotional needs and “passions,” 
rather than to what many hoped would actually happen in the healthcare-
reform town halls: democratically organized, rational discussion and debate. 
So what went wrong when these town-hall meetings, expected to be 
exemplars of modern deliberative democracy, were disrupted and, as many 
argued, actually subverted the democratic process? What can the actual practice 
of the healthcare-reform town halls teach us about both the theory and practice 
of deliberative democracy? 
III 
WHAT HAPPENED? DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND HEALTHCARE 
REFORM TOWN HALLS 
When debate about President Obama’s healthcare proposals increased, 
following the introduction of various congressional bills in 2009 and the failure 
to develop much bipartisan support (not through any lack of effort by the 
President and, at least, some Democrats), various politicians—including the 
President himself and members of the Senate and the House—held community 
town-hall meetings in the summer and fall of 2009. Many private and public 
organizations also sponsored a variety of community-based meetings to discuss 
a very complex set of proposals to reform healthcare, including such issues as 
coverage of preexisting conditions, coverage of children past twenty-one, public 
versus private payment plans,39 portability, closing the “donut hole” left by the 
Bush-era drug plan, lifetime caps on insurance coverage, and mandatory 
participation. 
The decisions to hold these meetings could themselves be the subject of a 
separate paper on healthcare reform and dispute processes, implicating issues of 
venue choice, articulation of goals, coalition formation, and ordering of 
negotiation partners.40 Perhaps due to the “capture” of the Clinton-era reform 
process by insurance and pharmaceutical interests and oppositionists in 
Congress, the Obama Administration and Democratic strategists, flush from a 
dramatic Presidential victory and a strong majority in Congress in November of 
 
 39. Single-payer plans, of course, were off the table after the Clinton-era failure to pass any major 
healthcare reforms. 
 40. See, e.g., James K. Sebenius, Sequencing To Build Coalitions: With Whom Should I Talk First?, 
in WISE CHOICES: DECISIONS, GAMES, AND NEGOTIATIONS 324, 325–26 (R. Zeckhauser et al. eds., 
1996). 
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2008, decided to take their reforms directly to the people.41 Since Obama was 
elected on a platform of “change,” strategists thought plans to change 
healthcare, in the face of identifying healthcare as a leading issue during the 
campaign,42 would be welcomed at the grassroots level. 
With less planning than dispute resolution professionals would have 
suggested, some early town-hall meetings were nothing more than relatively 
open sessions with hundreds—in a few cases, thousands—of participants. In 
many of the most controversial sessions with Senators Arlen Specter43 and 
Claire McCaskill,44 the Senators appeared virtually alone, with a single 
microphone, and tried (in some cases, desperately) to control what turned out 
to be very unruly crowds. When Senator Specter was attacked at one town-hall 
meeting in Philadelphia—at which he appeared with Kathleen Sebelius, 
Secretary of Health and Human Services—neither of them seemed to be in 
control of the microphone or the meeting. There was little ground-rule setting, 
meeting management, conflict assessment, small-group discussion, or agenda 
following, which would have been present in more professionally managed 
large-group policy discussions.45 
 
 41. For a sketch of how political problem-solving can be dispersed to more “intermediate sites” of 
public participation, see generally Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy, 3 
EUR. L.J. 313 (1997). 
 42. Some political commentators suggest that President Obama managed to capture this issue from 
Hillary Clinton during the Democratic presidential debates by offering “more moderate” change and 
pointing to her earlier failure. See Pildes, supra note 20 (arguing that one of the potential causes of the 
“extreme partisan polarization” in modern politics has been the “polarizing personalities of various 
recent political figures . . . who forged political breakthroughs across party and ideological lines to enact 
major policy initiatives”). 
 43. E.g., Panzramic, Crowd Explodes When Arlen Specter Urges That We Do This Fast, YOUTUBE 
(Aug. 2, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J-Bpshk5nX0; micahmj11x, The Crazies Come Out 
To Discuss HealthCare Reform, YOUTUBE (Aug. 2, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
gS4MI8fuXzw&feature=related. 
 44. Today Exclusive: McCaskill on Town Hall: “It Was Terrific” (NBC television broadcast Aug. 
12, 2009), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21134540/vp/32384500#32384500; lanser06, Town 
Hall to Claire McCaskill: We Don’t Trust You, YOUTUBE (Aug. 11, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=PDPpGJDelHI. 
 45. There are now several organizations, both for-profit and not-for-profit, that specifically manage 
meetings and arrange for such proceedings as town halls, dialogue groups, study circles, public 
conversations, and more formal governmental-policy and regulatory negotiations. For examples of two 
professional umbrella organizations, see INT’L ASS’N FOR PUB. PARTICIPATION, http://www.iap2.org 
(last visited Jan. 16, 2011), and NAT’L COAL. FOR DIALOGUE AND DELIBERATION, http:// 
www.ncdd.org (last visited Jan. 16, 2011). For an informative guide to resources helpful in building 
deliberation skills, see Resource Guide for Public Engagement, NAT’L COAL. FOR DIALOGUE AND 
DELIBERATION (Oct. 11, 2010), http://www.ncdd.org/files/NCDD2010_Resource_Guide.pdf. See also 
AMERICASPEAKS, http://www.americaspeaks.org (last visited Jan. 16, 2011); CONSENSUS BUILDING 
INST., http://www.cbuilding.org (last visited Jan. 16, 2011); EVERYDAY DEMOCRACY, http:// 
www.everyday-democracy.org (last visited Jan. 16, 2011); RESOLVE, http://www.resolv.org (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2011); NAT’L ISSUES FORUMS INST., http://www.nifi.org (last visited Jan. 16, 2011); POLICY 
CONSENSUS INITIATIVE, http://www.policyconsensus.org (last visited Jan. 16, 2011); PUBLIC 
CONVERSATIONS PROJECT, supra note 12. 
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As participants in the August 2009 town-hall meetings46 gathered in a variety 
of venues, both public media and private video (widely available on YouTube) 
portrayed sessions that were frequently interrupted by those opposing any 
major changes to private healthcare as currently delivered. One notorious sign 
ignorantly carried to one of the town-hall meetings proclaimed, “Keep the 
Guvmint (sic) out of my Medicare.”47 Medicare is, of course, a federal 
government program, providing universal health insurance to those over sixty-
five. 
High-level government officials, including senators, representatives, and 
cabinet officers, seemed quite shocked and blindsided by the disrupted 
meetings. To dispute resolution and deliberative democracy professionals, it 
seemed almost as if the professional politicians had a romanticized and 
unrealistic conception of town-hall meetings. It seemed as if they had their own 
conceptions of what it would be like to “go to the people” in a time far removed 
politically from the idealized (idyllically depicted) town-hall meetings of 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century colonial New England (and continuing in a 
few smaller or more homogenous locations in the present era).48 
In an important op-ed piece in the New York Times during the first set of 
town-hall meetings, political scientist and deliberative-polling advocate 
Professor James Fishkin argued research has demonstrated that the idealized 
town-hall format is not effective in larger groups (those with more than 
approximately 150 participants).49 But the town-hall meetings were advertised 
and managed as meetings for whole congressional districts of over 650,000 
voters. And the “intimate” town halls were instead unrepresentative samples of 
interest groups and particularly committed (and angry) individuals who used 
the occasions to disrupt the meetings and garner media attention for signs and 
 
 46. Sponsored by representatives from both political parties, including Senators Specter (R-PA) 
and McCaskill (D-MO), Representatives Barney Frank (D-MA) and Adam Schiff (D-CA), and 
government officials including Secretary Sebelius, Vice President Biden, and even President Obama. 
 47. Eric Kleefeld, Tea Party Sign: Keep the Guvmint Out of My Medicare, TALKING POINTS MEMO 
(Aug. 10, 2009), http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/08/tea-party-sign-keep-the-guvmint-out-of-
my-medicare.php. 
 48. At the Duke Law See You Out of Court: The Role of ADR in Healthcare symposium, 
commentator Ethan Katsh described still-successful town-hall meetings in his own New England town 
(Needham, Massachusetts, population 28,000) as very structured, with strong traditions of participation 
from generally polite people, respectful of the moderators’ authority. Given his own experience as an 
expert on cyberspace communication, e.g., ETHAN KATSH & JANET RIFKIN, ONLINE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: RESOLVING CONFLICTS IN CYBERSPACE (2001), he fully expected and hoped debate on 
the healthcare issues would offer the opportunity for mass deliberation on the Internet. Alas, conflict 
was, in fact, heightened in cyberspace commentary on healthcare. Ethan Katsh, Professor of Legal 
Studies & Dir. of the Ctr. for Info. Tech. & Dispute Resolution, Univ. of Mass. at Amherst, 
Commentary at the Duke Law and Contemporary Problems Symposium: See You Out of Court: The 
Role of ADR in Healthcare (Oct. 8, 2010). See also MICHAEL ZUCKERMAN, PEACEABLE KINGDOMS: 
NEW ENGLAND TOWNS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 154–86 (1970). 
 49. James Fishkin, Town Halls by Invitation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2009, available at http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/opinion/16fishkin.html. 
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outbursts denouncing “ObamaCare,” “Socialism,” and “the Nazi healthcare 
plan.” 
In an extreme example from a Dartmouth, Massachusetts town-hall 
meeting, when asked why he was supporting the Obama-supported “Nazi 
policy,” Representative Barney Frank retorted, “On what planet do you spend 
most of your time? . . . Trying to have a conversation with you would be like 
trying to argue with a dining room table.”50 In another heated meeting in 
California on September 2, 2009, a self-identified small-business owner, 
Katherine Bragg, screamed at the top of her voice that this healthcare plan was 
being “rammed down our throats.”51 Bragg exclaimed that when she has tried to 
call her congressperson in the past, the staff has cut her off, claiming they 
“know best,” and that the office responds to her opposition with emails stating, 
“Thank you for your support.”52 Her rants at that meeting were met with cheers 
of approval, and a recording of the event received many viewings later on 
YouTube. Tempers and words flamed on “both” sides of the “yes or no” of 
healthcare reform—hardly the stuff of Habermasian deliberative discourse and 
“ideal speech conditions.” 
In another widely televised town-hall meeting, opponents of healthcare 
reform shouted (at close range) at Senator Arlen Specter, a beleaguered, long-
serving Republican who changed parties in order to hold his seat 
(unsuccessfully), after being one of the few politicians to cross party lines (on 
this as well as other issues, like abortion rights). After one calmer and relatively 
polite participant queried Senator Specter about how citizens were expected to 
read and understand a bill that even some congressional members had said was 
too long and complex to read all the way through, Senator Specter responded, 
“We have to make judgments very fast.” This met with such uproarious 
explosions and paroxysms of shouts and applause that one (watching video of 
the meeting) cannot even hear his plaintive attempt to defend himself by 
assuring the gathered citizens: “I understand it before I vote.”53 
Commentary following these less-than-successful attempts to engage the 
populace in a spirited, yet reasoned, debate about healthcare also followed 
polarized and partisan lines. On the conservative side, commentator Peggy 
Noonan suggested the Democrats were surprised to learn how the voters really 
felt, upset by the Obama Administration’s assumption that because it had won 
on an “anti-Bush” campaign in 2008, the Administration was necessarily 
 
 50. Barney Frank Lashes Out at Protestor for Nazi Remark, U.S. NEWS, Aug. 19, 2009, available at 
http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2009/08/19/barney-frank-lashes-out-at-protester-for-nazi-
remark; see also PoliticsNewsPolitics, Barney Frank Confronts Woman at Town Hall Comparing 
Obama to Hitler, YOUTUBE (Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nYlZiWK2Iy8 (CNN 
Live News broadcast). 
 51. Speakmymind02, Woman Goes Nuclear at California Town Hall Meeting, YOUTUBE (Sept. 2, 
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aAm6Qck5v78&NR=1. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Panzramic, supra note 43. 
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guaranteed support of its health initiatives.54 Noonan accused a Democratic 
operative of calling the healthcare plan “Hillary’s revenge.”55 Claiming that the 
Democrats mistook Obama’s victory for a “mandate without context,” Noonan 
(as well as others) implied that after managing the economic crisis with 
expensive government bailout programs, the population was not ready to 
endorse another big government program.56 Noonan accused the “leftosphere 
and liberal commentariat” of failing to see the town-hall sentiments as 
“authentic,” saying that people “show up only if they care.”57 She also accused 
the Democrats of criticizing the town-hall meetings from two inconsistent sides, 
alleging that, on the one hand, the Democrats argued the town-hall participants 
were “ginned up,” carrying swastikas and anti-government slogans.58 On the 
other hand, she claimed, the Democrats charged that the disrupters were 
“suspiciously well-dressed in jackets and ties from Brooks Brothers” and that 
“[t]hey must be Republican rent-a-mobs.”59 
House Leaders Nancy Pelosi and Steny Hoyer were compelled to withdraw 
a statement they had made, in print and orally, that these town-hall protesters 
were “un-American.”60 They had complained about the disruptions and were 
countered with allegations that they were suppressing First Amendment–
protected speech. Conservative commentator Ivan Kenneally wrote about 
Democrats who were prompted to “cancel appearances and limit their 
communications to press releases” and who “have attempted to squash public 
debate under the sheer weight of rhetorical condescension,” increasingly aware 
of “unusually spirited opposition to Democrat proposals for sweeping reform.”61 
Kenneally accused the Administration of “attempt[ing] to fast-track an 
immensely complex piece of legislation, ensuring that a transparent national 
debate is impossible and that even our legislators remain ignorant of the details 
of the proposal.”62 
In a direct attempt to polarize democratic deliberation, commentators like 
Kenneally accused President Obama and his Administration of having 
“contempt for public debate[—]one of the hallmarks of [his] technocratic 
approach to politics,” writing that “in place of healthy and democratic 
deference to public opinion, we get the assurance of expertise that comes with a 
 
 54. Peggy Noonan, “You Are Terrifying Us”, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2009, available at http:// 
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204908604574334623330098540.html. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. (“[T]hey thought that in the middle of a historic recession featuring horrific deficits, they 
could assume support for the invention of a huge new entitlement carrying huge new costs.”). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. (“Nancy Pelosi . . . accused the people at the meetings of ‘carrying swastikas and symbols 
like that.’”). 
 59. Id. (attributing to Senator Barbara Boxer claims that these town-hall protesters “were ‘well 
dressed,’ that ‘this is all organized,’ ‘all planned,’ to ‘hurt our president’”). 
 60. Ivan Kenneally, The Public Option, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Aug. 12, 2009, available at http:// 
www.nationalreview.com/articles/print/228050. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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bevy of special-issue czars.”63 Democratic deliberation, it is argued, is in 
opposition to expertise, specialization, and science. When they continue the 
polarizing refrains, Democrats are then, in turn, accused of “counter[ing] the 
healthcare critics” by organizing masses of union members to attend later town 
halls.64 Thus, far from the reasoned deliberation of many voices with different 
views, these town-hall meetings65 quickly deteriorated into very partisan 
shouting matches between administration officials seeking approval and 
support for healthcare reform and those opposed to virtually any government 
role in the healthcare system. 
Despite conservative commentators’ characterizing the meetings as 
“authentic” and “spontaneous,” there is clear evidence that at least some of the 
opposition was, indeed, planned and orchestrated. In a memo called Rocking 
the Town Halls—Best Practices, Tea Party66 supporters were urged to follow the 
example set when Connecticut anti-reformists “pack[ed] the hall” and 
aggressively challenged Congressman Jim Himes during a May 2009 town hall.67 
Based on their success at leaving Congressman Himes “staggered” with their 
“reality check from we-the-people,” this right-wing group developed this best-
practices manifesto to “organize for success,” and urged supporters to “use the 
Alinsky playbook of which the Left is so fond: freeze it, attack it, personalize it, 
and polarize it.”68 The suggested best practices included moving oppositionists 
around the room to disrupt from within, meeting before town halls to plan 
strategies, holding press conferences before and after to “claim victory”; 
“rock[ing] the boat early in the Rep’s presentation”; “yell[ing] out and 
challeng[ing] the Rep’s statements early”; using protest signs outside the 
meeting; getting press coverage; developing hostile questions about the 
“Socialist” agenda and “be[ing] persistent” about asking them; getting the rest 
of the crowd to applaud your question; and making the questions long and 
complicated with statistics to put the Rep on the spot, “rattle him,” and get him 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Noonan, supra note 54. 
 65. And their media coverage, but that is a subject for another paper. See generally Symposium, 
International Media and Conflict Resolution, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (2009), available at http:// 
epublications.marquette.edu/mulr/vol93/iss1. 
 66. The Tea Party movement originated from the slogan “Taxed Enough Already” (TEA), in 
reference to the Boston Tea Party rebellion against taxes on tea in the colonial era. 
 67. Bob MacGuffie, Rocking the Town Halls—Best Practices, in Memo Details Co-ordinated Anti-
Harassment Strategy 1, TALKING POINTS MEMO, http://talkingpointsmemo.com/documents/2009/08/ 
memo-details-co-ordinated-anti-reform-harrassment-strategy.php?page=1 (last visited Jan. 17, 2011). 
See Dan Quinlan, Himes Faces Tough Crowd at Library, FAIRFIELDMINUTEMAN.COM, June 4, 2009, 
in id., at 4 (describing the disruption at the Himes town hall). 
 68. MacGuffie, Rocking the Town Halls, supra note 67, at 1. The memo is referring to SAUL D. 
ALINKSY, RULES FOR RADICALS: A PRACTICAL PRIMER FOR REALISTIC RADICALS (1971), a 
manifesto for progressive community organizing that, ironically, Tea Party and Right Principles 
organizers urged their supporters to use. 
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“off his agenda.”69 Among a list of “focused questions for congressional 
representatives” are: 
1. You have broken the back of the American taxpayer. Just how much household 
debt do YOU think is enough? . . . 
. . . . 
5. We all understand that National Health Care means rationing health care. What 
aspects of health care would you propose rationing? And to whom and what groups of 
people would you ration care?70 
6. Why do you believe that government is more qualified to manage health care than 
private industry? Point to an area where government has successfully managed health 
care and exercised fiduciary responsibility. Medicare and Medicare [sic] have been 
financial failures. Point to a country where national health care has not been rationed? 
7. YOU have voted for a socialist agenda. Please explain why you believe a socialist 
approach to governing, as opposed to a free market approach[,] is optimum. Do you 
believe that people would prefer their government to control their income, their 
health care, their retirement, their investments, their children’s education, their choice 
of cars, what they eat and drink, etc.?71 
Whether fully organized or not, one town-hall meeting after another was 
disrupted with leading or loaded questions like those above;72 hostile shouting, 
yelling, and screaming; uncontrolled outbursts and applause; and even, in a few 
cases, physical contretemps, leading to the removal of some protesters and even 
a few arrests. In very few televised portions of these meetings (and those 
viewable on YouTube) was an experienced moderator or facilitator present to 
manage and skillfully shape the conversation in a productive way. Those with 
President Obama were more orderly and controlled, in large measure because 
of pre-event and event security and ticketed, if not randomized, attendance. 
At least one notable exception was Senator Claire McCaskill’s solitary 
(standing at a podium on her own) but effective presence in presiding over her 
 
 69. MacGuffie, Rocking the Town Halls, supra note 67, at 1–2. 
 70. Sarah Palin managed to cleverly convert this issue into a claim that healthcare reform would 
result in “death panels” with the government deciding who would live or die. Those supporting 
healthcare reform explained that (1) there were no such things as “death panels” and (2) healthcare is 
currently “rationed” by private insurance companies, which could themselves be considered death 
panels. 
 71. MacGuffie, Focused Questions for Congressional Representatives, in Memo Details Co-
ordinated Anti-Harassment Strategy, supra note 67, at 8. 
 72. Readers of this paper who are clinical professors, political consultants, journalists, and 
professional conflict resolution facilitators and moderators will know about the logic of question 
framing and the need for open-ended questions to really facilitate open discussion and information. See 
generally DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 
(2004) (focusing on client’s perspective in lawyer-client communications); STEPHEN ELLMANN ET AL., 
LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (2009) (examining 
practical and theoretical challenges lawyers face with clients). For question protocols for facilitating 
meetings on controversial subjects, see generally PUBLIC CONVERSATIONS PROJECT, supra note 12. 
See also JOHN P. ROBINSON & ROBERT MEADOW, POLLS APART: A CALL FOR CONSISTENCY IN 
SURVEYS OF PUBLIC OPINION ON WORLD ISSUES (1982); ROGER SCHWARZ, THE SKILLED 
FACILITATOR: A COMPREHENSIVE RESOURCE FOR CONSULTANTS, FACILITATORS, MANAGERS, 
TRAINERS, AND COACHES (2d ed. 2002). 
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own town-hall meeting. Given her midwestern, calm, experienced-elected-
official demeanor,73 she was actually able to keep some calm in her session. 
Utilizing a method commonly employed in more planned deliberative sessions, 
she asked participants to put their questions in a goldfish bowl, from which she 
would choose questions at random, thus delaying and distancing the personal 
invective and anger of the questioner. Coyly labeled “goldfish bowl democracy” 
by newscaster Keith Olbermann,74 McCaskill’s town halls, though also 
disrupted, at least attempted to use some professional facilitator’s tools. 
In an interview on NBC’s TODAY Show, following the disruption of her 
town-hall meeting, Senator McCaskill remained calm and empathetic to her 
attackers: “There were thousands of people there. I was proud of the people 
that showed up.”75 Even after having people scream “No” at her, Senator 
McCaskill said she didn’t take it personally, explaining “these are people that 
are very distrustful of government.” According to McCaskill, the people were 
misinformed. She appreciated that her state was “evenly divided” between Left 
and Right, so she was hoping to work toward a “compromise” in the middle for 
“stable insurance coverage.” Commenting that she had brought her eighty-one-
year-old mother to the raucous session, Senator McCaskill said it was hard for 
her mother, who “isn’t used to people who are that rude.” She said that, 
generally, Missourians had “good manners.” These people were not very 
effective, according to McCaskill: “Just because you’re loud doesn’t mean 
you’re right.” When queried as to whether the Administration was “push[ing] 
healthcare reform too fast,” McCaskill acknowledged “pent-up frustration,” but 
said the plan had to be “big and hard” to fix the problem. She was direct and 
responsive to questions from interlocutors at the town hall and in subsequent 
television interviews. Senator McCaskill is, perhaps, a more natural large-group 
facilitator. 
In viewing and reading about the disruptions at the town-hall meetings, 
many factual and empirical questions remain. Though there was much anger 
and emotion expressed, it remains unclear how much disruption was 
individually motivated; many of those who shouted in anger had complaints 
about particular “adverse medical events” of family members, or about cost and 
financial issues regarding healthcare, while others clearly had much larger 
agendas than healthcare. Many of the organized protests pertained to specific 
 
 73. Of course, it is also possible that her gender had something to do with it; but Secretary 
Sebelius, also an experienced mid-western elected official, did not fare so well when she appeared at 
other town-hall meetings. For a discussion on the enormously complicated role of gender in dispute 
resolution roles, see generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a 
Woman’s Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 39 (1985); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, 
Catherine H. Tinsley, Sandra Cheldelin & Emily T. Amanatullah, Likeability v. Competence: The 
Impossible Choice Faced by Female Politicians, Attenuated by Lawyers, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
POL’Y 363 (2010). 
 74. Transcript of Countdown with Keith Olbermann, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 
32386278/ns/msnbc_tv-countdown_with_keith_olbermann (MSNBC television broadcast Aug. 11, 
2009). 
 75. Today Exclusive: McCaskill on Town Hall: “It Was Terrific”, supra note 44. 
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objections to President Obama, to Democrats generally (unhappy “losers” from 
the last election sabotaging attempts at bipartisan conversation?), or to much 
bigger issues involving perceptions of “Big Government” or wasteful 
government spending. Still others expressed general frustration with 
government (both federal and state) that is large, expensive, and distant, all at a 
time of great economic uncertainty and two ongoing, divisive wars. It is very 
difficult to disentangle so many politically salient events and issues to study in 
any systematic way how the town hall—a, perhaps, over-romanticized form of 
deliberative democracy—could have been used in public consideration of a 
single, but very complex, issue like healthcare. 
So what went “wrong,”76 and what can and should be done about it? 
Assessing the failures of the healthcare town halls as an opportunity to scale up 
various forms of deliberative democracy raises the following questions about 
the theory and practice of large-scale policy deliberation and dispute resolution: 
1.  Was the “failure” of the healthcare town halls attributable to 
a. the healthcare issue; 
b.  the political climate; or 
c.  naiveté about town-hall processes? 
2.  What forms of deliberative democracy could be used generally to 
promote informed public participation in policy making? 
a. Are all issues treatable in the same way, or are some issues 
especially controversial, requiring different methods? 
b. What is the relationship of collective or organized participation 
to individual participation in public-policy deliberation? (Are 
successful methods of ADR in smaller-scale disputes—such as 
active listening, empathy, interest-based negotiation, mediation, 
and facilitated group discussion—adaptable to highly organized 
and polarized group processes?77) Are different kinds of 
processes necessary for different purposes (actual decision 
making and policy drafting versus educative or informational 
events)? 
 
 76. I write this as both a conflict resolution and deliberative democracy scholar and practitioner, 
and one who generally favored healthcare reform. Those who were trying to derail healthcare reform 
could claim that the town halls were quite successful—they helped remove a public option from the 
plan completely; drew media attention to popular opposition to healthcare reform; and very 
successfully polarized and simplified an otherwise extremely complex and nuanced issue. 
 77. The literature of multi-party and group dispute resolution is now replete with its own divergent 
theories about “groupthink,” see generally IRVING JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF 
POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES (1982) (describing the psychological processes at work within group 
decision making, particularly the human need for peer approval), and evolving extremism, see generally 
Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000) 
(investigating the phenomenon of group polarization in public deliberation). 
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c.  What are the purposes of deliberative democracy? To educate 
(or persuade) the public on important issues? To measure 
existing public opinion (polling) or to change it (deliberative 
polling)? To develop policy alternatives or to discuss existing or 
proposed policies? To actually decide on what policies should be 
adopted or to simply discuss them?78 
3. How “democratic” is democratic deliberation really? 
a. If scaled-up deliberation requires leadership and facilitation 
(through consensus-building or facilitated-policy dialogues), 
what is the theory behind expert facilitation in democratic 
models of equal participation? 
b. If thoughtful deliberation requires adequate preparation and 
education (as in Fishkin’s Deliberative Polling methods79 or 
structured-regulatory or legislative negotiation80), how 
democratic can the process be with teachers, leaders, guides, and 
dedicated time commitments?81 
4. What constitutes deliberative discourse? Must it be “reasoned” or 
“reasonable”? What is the role of other forms of discourse—
emotions, instrumental trading, deep-value commitments, and 
differences—in efforts to develop an informed and respectful polity 
in democratic decision making? 
In short, is it possible to scale up deliberative democracy to provide 
intelligent deliberative processes for consensual, political decision making? 
 
 78. In theory and in fact, all of these different purposes have been used in a wide variety of public-
deliberation events from consensus-building fora to public conversations, to study circles, to negotiated 
rulemaking. See, e.g., THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK 679–1087, supra note 11 (presenting 
cases and commentaries). 
 79. See generally FISHKIN, supra note 10. 
 80. E.g., Symposium on Collaborative Governance, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 269, 269–448 (2009). 
 81. The critiques of deliberative processes’ time demands have been made for decades, most 
famously by Oscar Wilde: “The trouble with Socialism is that it takes up too many evenings,” OSCAR 
WILDE: A LIFE IN QUOTES 238 (Barry Day ann. & ed., 2000); and, more recently, by political theorist 
Iris Young and other feminist theorists, who note the class and gender assumptions regarding who is 
available to actively participate in time-consuming, democratic deliberative processes, see, e.g., IRIS 
MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY (2000) (noting those without childcare 
responsibilities and those who have flexible work schedules are usually the ones available). See 
generally IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990) (arguing that for 
many excluded or otherwise subordinated people, other forms of democracy—for example, public 
protests and narratives—might be more effective ways of expressing preferences); DEMOCRACY AND 
DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) 
(reconsidering the foundations of democratic theory and practice in the light of the politics of 
difference). 
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IV 
CAN DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY BE SCALED UP? IS IT HEALTHCARE OR IS 
IT DEMOCRATIC PROCESS? 
Efforts to understand and then correct for these failed efforts at engaging 
the polity have been many since the town halls were abandoned, and a much 
more complex healthcare-reform bill was passed (absent the public-health 
program previously intended to compete with private insurance coverage). 
Some claim the disruptions of the town-hall meetings were specific to the 
issue at hand: healthcare. Healthcare is simply “about life and death.”82 It is not 
something that we are very rational about. Healthcare is something that 
everyone needs, that some have and some do not, and that virtually all are 
dissatisfied with. Healthcare is also a difficult issue because it separates 
different groups of haves and have-nots. In healthcare, all are stakeholders, but 
the stakeholders are very differentially endowed. Some have healthcare 
insurance and good services; some have only one of these things; some have 
neither. This is an issue that divides by class and geography. Some need 
healthcare perpetually (the chronically ill); some need it only briefly or 
temporarily (preventative-care patients, babies and children, or the occasionally 
ill). Some have single, or rare but catastrophic, healthcare needs (cancer 
victims, accident victims, or patients undergoing major operations); others are 
healthy (especially the young, who sometimes act as if they don’t need 
healthcare at all, but whose parents often worry about and pay for their 
infrequent care and health insurance). This issue divides by age, geography, 
class, and luck; so there is some randomness and the potential for some 
empathy. But this also individualizes, rather than collectivizes, the issue. Those 
who vote are more likely to have healthcare than those who do not (another 
fact that divides by class and political participation—quite relevant in assessing 
the representativeness of these meetings). 
Then there are the caregivers: dedicated but often unprofessional family 
members, most often women,83 and the medical profession and its auxiliaries—
nurses, aides, institutional and home-based caregivers, and (increasingly now) 
immigrant workers. This issue also divides by class, geography, and ethnicity. 
And then there are the divisions within the professional classes: malpractice 
lawyers, doctors, insurers, and victims of bad medical treatment or “adverse 
medical events” (the now commonly used euphemism), which may be suffered 
by individuals or large groups who can then profit from class actions and other 
aggregative litigation modes.84 This pits interest groups of various sorts against 
 
 82. Nancy Dubler, supra note 9 (pithily and accurately put). 
 83. See generally EMILY K. ABEL, WHO CARES FOR THE ELDERLY: PUBLIC POLICY AND THE 
EXPERIENCES OF ADULT DAUGHTERS (1991) (studying adult daughters’ experiences as primary and 
private source of caregiving for elderly population). 
 84. In my own brief experience with healthcare reform in the Clinton Administration, Democrats 
in both the executive and legislative branches sought my advice on how to begin to structure alternative 
dispute resolution for a wide range of medical disputes. After watching many dedicated politicians, 
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each other, many arguing that the high cost of malpractice insurance drives up 
the cost of medical care, and that “jackpot” jury verdicts line the pockets of a 
few “lucky” (from major injuries and accidents?) victims and an elite group of 
lawyers.85 
Then there are the providers and suppliers of services: hospitals, 
pharmaceutical companies, medical-device companies, and medical-worker 
unions. These entities often compete for funds, sometimes in zero-sum 
distributive settings (in both for-profit and nonprofit organizational structures) 
and sometimes against common “foes” (food and drug regulations, health and 
safety standards, and the regulatory state, in general). 
In short, healthcare- (and public-health-) policy issues have a large number 
of stakeholders, including everyone in the polity, but these people have very 
different “stakes” in the policy choices—both in terms of life and life-cycle 
experiences, as well as professional and financial issues. 
In some theoretical models of disputing, this would be a good thing—many 
different interests could be used to trade and bargain across differently valued 
preferences86 on different issues, and trades and bargains could be made. But as 
this issue developed in a partisan political environment and in a very public 
forum (in contrast to Hillary Clinton’s initial desire to keep the healthcare-
reform process more private, which Elster suggested was a good thing in the 
American constitutional-formation process87), it became particularly difficult to 
make “trades” across class, interest, and role (professional and political) lines. 
This is slightly more possible in more confidential dispute resolution settings, 
commonly occurring in mass-tort, employment, and other forms of class-action 
litigation and settlements.88 Others argue that the finally enacted law is, in fact, 
the product of these “unprincipled” compromises, maintaining private 
insurance with public mandates of coverage, but that legislative negotiation was 
not the sort of “efficient,” bargained-for trading that dispute resolution 
theorists had in mind.89 
 
experts, and civil servants work very hard on possible legislation and regulation, these terms fell away 
as a large part of the Democratic Party’s financial base (namely, the most successful of trial lawyers) 
effectively lobbied to remove these provisions. 
 85. Contra TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005) (arguing that the real cause 
of high insurance premiums is not actually excessive malpractice litigation). 
 86. See supra Table 1 (column titled “Bargaining”). 
 87. Elster, supra note 33, at 244. 
 88. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules 
Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159 (discussing ethical and procedural issues in mass torts and 
medical and health-related class-action settlements) (1995). 
 89. In close to thirty years of teaching negotiation (half of them in Washington, D.C.), I have 
always had to exclude legislative negotiation from the theories and practices that I teach. Legislative 
negotiation is neither distributive nor integrative. Even “mixed” legislative negotiation (including 
logrolling, “pork” bargaining, and other terms of art) does not conform to any existing model of 
negotiation. Thank you to my former student Donald Schriber (UCLA class of 1987) who recognized 
this in his first of many, many years on the Hill (and especially during the Clinton Administration’s 
healthcare-reform process). 
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So healthcare—with literally millions of stakeholders, both organized into 
interest groups and not organized at all—may, perhaps, be too vast, diffuse, and 
divisive a topic on which to model or practice our theories of deliberative 
democracy. Adding to the complexities of healthcare policy itself are 
unpredictable medical advances; new illnesses borne by pests, foods, and 
increased human interaction and transnational travel;90 staggering cost 
increases; and the divisiveness of the political process in the midst of an 
economic recession and two complex wars. The result is a political context that, 
perhaps, was (and is) too contentious for true, informed “deliberation” on this 
particularly difficult issue. Complicating this already complex situation is the 
possibility that healthcare became a “surrogate” for the general expression of 
opposition to the newly elected political regime. Instead of a truly issue-based 
discussion, the healthcare debate was the collective action of “sore losers” in 
the larger political environment. Structuring dialogue around a single issue, 
when other political issues may be inseparably intertwined, may prove 
particularly difficult. 
Observing the healthcare town halls and the media reaction, one is struck by 
the daily enactment of one of our key dispute resolution concepts: “reactive 
devaluation.”91 Whatever one “side” argued for, the other side immediately 
counter-“attacked” and rejected. In a complex environment like that of 
healthcare policy, issues are complex and multi-faceted and are not always 
binary—they can exist on a continuum. The pro and con debate and 
“agonistic”92 modes of discourse that were used in these meetings are 
particularly unhelpful in facilitating “reasoned” and “nuanced” discourse where 
policy choices are complex, intertwined, and interactive.93 
More sophisticated models of deliberation (including Public Conversations 
Project’s protocols for facilitating difficult conversations94) seek to identify and 
utilize the sources of disagreement (not only from facts, but from different life 
experiences), the questions of uncertainty or incomplete information requiring 
further investigation, and the recognition of a gradation of views on certain 
subjects. For example, when I helped to co-facilitate deliberative fora for the 
 
 90. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, GLOBAL HEALTH LAW: INTERNATIONAL LAW, GLOBAL 
INSTITUTIONS, AND WORLD HEALTH (Harvard Univ. Press, forthcoming 2012). 
 91. See generally Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in 
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 33, at 26 (exploring reactive devaluation theory and 
offering suggestions to overcome this artificial barrier to negotiation). 
 92. DEBORAH TANNEN, THE ARGUMENT CULTURE: MOVING FROM DEBATE TO DIALOGUE 3–
4, 8–10 (1998). 
 93. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural 
World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 5 (1996) (“[P]olarized debate distorts the truth, leaves out 
important information, simplifies complexity, and obfuscates rather than clarifies.”). See Lon L. Fuller, 
Mediation: Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 312–14 (1971) (offering a classic 
description of disputes with “web-like” issue interaction). 
 94. Constructive Conversations about Challenging Times: A Guide to Community Dialogue, Version 
6.0, PUBLIC CONVERSATIONS PROJECT (Jan. 2011), http://www.publicconversations.org/docs/Comm 
GuideREVISEDJan2011.pdf. 
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controversial Proposition 209 in California (dealing with affirmative action in 
education, employment, and government contracting), we were able to 
fractionate and compare views about affirmative action in three different 
spheres—education, employment, and public contracting. Within groups, 
opinions varied greatly on these three dimensions. Nonetheless, the political 
process ultimately turned these more nuanced discussions into yes or no votes 
on a single issue.95 
In addition to reactive devaluation, polarization, and aggregation of issues, 
these town-hall meetings displayed many other forms of cognitive and social 
errors in deliberation, negotiation, and decision making96 (for example, 
anchoring, overconfidence, irrational escalation, status-quo bias, and 
endowment effects) with little to no evidence that those presiding over the 
meetings had any understanding of these concepts or how to manage them. 
The town-hall meetings were also procedural disasters. The desire to “go 
straight to the people,” with little thought about process design, made these 
meetings anarchistic and amorphous free-for-alls, with few formal ground rules 
and little facilitation or moderating. In some cases, a government official—
whether President Obama, a senator, or a cabinet official—“presided” over the 
meetings alone, making statements with “positions” and then eliciting random 
comments from lined-up questioners. There was little to no implementation of 
the now relatively well-developed formats of large policy debates—no evidence 
of consensus building, with ground rules, facilitation, brainstorming, recording, 
and small-group task forces;97 no guided conversations with position-clarifying 
questions, as in the Public Conversations Project methods;98 no Scandinavian 
study circles; and no AmericaSpeaks-moderated fora99 with trained facilitators, 
smaller groups (at seated tables) feeding into larger plenary-group discussions, 
straw votes, and procedures for ordering and altering discussion topics. A 
variety of professionals, from AmericaSpeaks’s Carolyn Lukensmeyer to Daniel 
Yankolovich,100 as well as many other public-policy facilitators,101 could have 
 
 95. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 93, at 34–35. 
 96. See MAX H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 56 (1992) 
(discussing eliminating social and cognitive errors from “rational” negotiation); Daniel Kahneman & 
Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 
supra note 33, at 44, 46; JOHN A. BARGH & EZEQUIEL MORSELLA, The Unconscious Mind, 3 PERSP. 
ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 1, 73, 76 (2008). 
 97. See generally THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 11; LAWRENCE E. 
SUSSKIND & JEFFREY L. CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT’S RULES: THE NEW WAY TO RUN YOUR 
MEETING, BUILD CONSENSUS, AND GET RESULTS (2006) (providing practical guides on facilitating 
successful meetings). 
 98. For examples of dialogue guides, see PUBLIC CONVERSATIONS PROJECT, supra note 12. 
 99. AMERICASPEAKS, supra note 45. 
 100. See generally DANIEL YANKELOVICH, THE MAGIC OF DIALOGUE: TRANSFORMING 
CONFLICT INTO COOPERATION (1999) (exploring the concept of “transformative dialogue”). 
 101. See Lawrence Susskind, How Should You Respond to the Noisy Health Reform Critics, THE 
CONSENSUS BUILDING APPROACH (Aug. 11, 2009, 12:15 PM), http://theconsensusbuildingapproach 
.blogspot.com. Other facilitators include Susan Poziba, Judy Innes, David Booher, Susan Carpenter, 
and Peter Adler. See also Symposium, Raising the Bar: What Deliberative Democracy Means for 
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designed much more focused and facilitated processes to deal with these 
barriers to deliberative democracy. So what were the politicians who created 
and conducted these town-hall meetings thinking? 
As noted above, an idealized version of American town-hall meetings may 
have prevented political strategists from understanding both the “science” and 
the “art” behind our conflict resolution field. Distinguished scholars, such as 
Thomas Schelling and Howard Raiffa, have demonstrated that numbers matter, 
and numbers matter a lot in decision making, negotiation, and dispute 
resolution.102 Town-hall-type meetings (like classrooms) have breaking points of 
about 150, at which it is virtually impossible to carry an orderly conversation 
while maintaining full interaction among all participants. Thus, modern conflict 
resolution professionals know that plenary groups must be separated from task, 
committee, and caucus groups, feeding back into larger groups. Different sets of 
rules and procedures and different kinds of management, facilitation, and 
mediation are necessary for different group sizes. Small-group deliberation has 
its own set of issues and problems, so the two types of deliberative processes 
must be balanced and measured. 
The different functions of deliberative bodies will also affect what processes 
can be used. Groups of people who vote and make decisions are different from 
groups of people who gather to learn from and inform their members. How one 
votes, what order parties speak in, and how discussion is monitored and 
“handed-off” to others are now all matters of study and best (and varied) 
practices in group deliberation. Whether group-deliberation events are 
designed to be informational or “sharing,” rather than voting and decisional, is 
quite significant in terms of planning, structuring, and executing the actual 
practice of deliberative democracy. Whether groups should be fully transparent 
and public, or engaged in more confidential but (at least temporarily) secret 
conversations to reveal real needs and interests or to cut deals or compromises, 
is not so simple a question as it might appear in deliberative democracy 
practice, or even in theory. Thus, “realist proceduralists” who actually have 
experience in managing such complex issues and events are needed as empirical 
correctives to the overly romanticized and abstracted “procedural philosophy” 
of both Habermasian theorists and naïve political operatives. 
 
Dispute Resolution, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2006, at 1 (featuring articles on discussions from the 
Workshop on Deliberative Democracy and Dispute Resolution, MIT, June 24–25, 2005). For more 
background, see PON, http://www.pon.harvard.edu (last visited Mar. 19, 2011) (Program on 
Negotiation at Harvard Law School); PUBLIC DISPUTES PROGRAM, http://web.mit.edu/publicdisputes 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2011) (MIT’s project within PON at Harvard Law School dealing directly with 
public-policy disputes within countries). 
 102. See generally HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982) 
(emphasizing the importance of recognizing mutual benefits in negotiation); HOWARD RAIFFA WITH 
JOHN RICHARDSON & DAVID METCALFE, NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS: THE SCIENCE AND ART OF 
COLLABORATIVE DECISION MAKING (2002) (incorporating into negotiation analysis the concepts of 
individual-decision analysis, judgmental decision making, and game theory); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, 
THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960) (analyzing international conflict resolution in terms of game 
theory). 
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Political strategists were blindsided by the organized and acrimonious 
presence of those known in the facilitation field as “hold-outs,” “bad seeds,” 
“troublemakers,” “vetoes,” “oppositionists,” or (in simple nonjargon terms) 
“difficult people.” There are ways and methods of dealing with such people and 
the situations they put us in during deliberation103—short of silencing, removing, 
and arresting. Screening is one such method, but, like leadership and 
facilitation, it presents issues for democratic theory in deliberation. Trained 
mediators can help with “bad seeds” in smaller groups. Skilled public-policy 
facilitators use public shaming, exclusion, and disarming techniques. Whether 
such techniques work as well in public and televised meetings remains to be 
seen, tried, and evaluated. 
In one sustained critique of the town halls, political scientist James Fishkin 
argued for his own “deliberative polling,” which selects random members of a 
polity and then provides neutrally developed factual material to a 
representative subset.104 This material is then studied before the group appears 
at moderated and facilitated discussions of particular policy issues and choices.105 
Fishkin has argued in a series of books and articles that such moderated and 
moderate discussion actually does change minds and opinions.106 Although his 
work remains controversial and not fully empirically validated,107 Fishkin 
presents a more modern deliberation model. Information and education first 
inform the deliberators, as opposed to tapping into strongly held (perhaps 
atavistic) attitudes and opinions—which are, perhaps, too vividly based on 
recent experiences or molded by familial, religious, or demographic 
characteristics and affiliations and, thus, may not shed specific light on 
particular issues. 
Fishkin’s models, like other deliberative democracy practices, are structured 
around trained leaders and facilitators. In contrast to the political theory and 
empirical studies of Jon Elster, or the feeling-centered and passion-focused 
political commentary of Senator McCaskill and Peggy Noonan, Fishkin’s model 
still assumes a Habermasian world of reasoned persuasion and argument, even 
if aided by specific educational and procedural interventions. 
Thus, even the new professional models of deliberative democracy leave us 
with some challenges in constructing effective deliberation fora on such volatile 
issues as healthcare. As a matter of democratic theory, the question remains 
whether the role of a professional facilitator or skilled moderator, which seems 
to be essential for orderly deliberative processes, must be more theorized and 
 
 103. See generally, e.g., DOUGLAS STONE ET AL., DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS: HOW TO DISCUSS 
WHAT MATTERS MOST (2000) (providing a practical approach to facilitating challenging 
conversations). 
 104. See generally James S. Fishkin, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND 
DEMOCRACY (1995). 
 105. Id. at 161; FISHKIN, supra note 10, at 80–85. 
 106. See generally, e.g., JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION (1991). 
 107. See Lynn M. Sanders, Making Deliberation Cooler, 19 GOOD SOC’Y, no.1, 2010, at 41, 43 
(stating that it “remains an open, empirical question whether” Fishkin’s theories are “realistic”). 
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justified within democratic theory.108 If participants are to be equal or, at least, 
equally heard under “ideal speech conditions,” then how are we to justify a 
hierarchical structure of procedural expertise? Although such roles are 
justifiable and legitimate, as are other leadership roles in democracy (for 
example, presidents, senators, and judges), who chooses or votes for the leader 
or facilitator? Who can remove or reject such a leader—one only encountered 
in a meeting? By what process should ground rules be chosen? Democratically 
voted on? “Laid-down” by the expert facilitator? On what authority does the 
facilitator base her actions? And how much power does she have during a 
deliberative event to control process, choose speakers, and eject 
troublemakers? These are important issues and questions for theory and 
practice alike.109 
The healthcare town halls so vividly highlighted an issue requiring our 
immediate theory-building and practical attention: the “passions” mode of 
deliberative discourse.110 How can, and how should, deliberative democracy deal 
with passions, emotions, and strongly held values, especially those which seem 
to be inconsistent with other people’s equally strongly held values? Too much 
democratic and political theory has mistakenly focused exclusively on reason 
and principle.111 The economists (and some political scientists and policy and 
legal scholars) allow traded preferences and instrumental and (ultimately, they 
hope) efficient bargaining to come into the discourse.112 But not enough 
attention has been paid to managing “passions,” emotions, values, or the 
“affective” dimensions in either dispute resolution or deliberative democracy.113 
As a matter of practice, more conventional forms of dispute resolution at the 
 
 108. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyers’ Role in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 347, 362–
63 (2004–2005). See also Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS 407, at 422 (James Bohman & 
William Rehg eds., 1997); Sanders, supra note 107, at 42. 
 109. As one wise sage once said (Yogi Berra?), in theory, theory works; in practice, it doesn’t. Or, as 
Donald Schön suggests, a theory is only as useful as a “theory in use”—a theory that works (to explain, 
to guide). DONALD A. SCHÖN, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER 10–11 (1983). See generally Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder: Ethics for a New Practice, 70 TENN. L. REV. 63 
(2002). 
 110. See supra Table 1 (column titled “Passions”). 
 111. For examples of theorists (and feminists of my generation) who counterweight emotions or 
other processes to “pure reason,” see generally VIRGINIA HELD, THE ETHICS OF CARING: PERSONAL, 
POLITICAL, AND GLOBAL (2006); ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART (1983); 
CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE 
APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION (2003); THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes 
ed., 2001). 
 112. See supra Table 1 (column titled “Bargaining”). 
 113. For examples of efforts to deal with these issues in dispute resolution practice, see generally E. 
FRANKLIN DUKES ET AL., REACHING FOR HIGHER GROUND IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: TOOLS FOR 
POWERFUL GROUPS AND COMMUNITIES (2000); JOHN FORESTER, DEALING WITH DIFFERENCES: 
DRAMAS OF MEDIATING PUBLIC DISPUTES (2009); JOHN FORESTER, THE DELIBERATIVE 
PRACTITIONER: ENCOURAGING PARTICIPATORY PLANNING PROCESSES (1999); LAWRENCE 
SUSSKIND & PATRICK FIELD, DEALING WITH AN ANGRY PUBLIC: THE MUTUAL GAINS APPROACH 
TO RESOLVING DISPUTES (1996). 
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individual level, like mediation, clearly allow emotions in the room.114 (What 
mediator would work without a box of tissues?) As our polity is increasingly 
polarized and exaggerated by extremists and media, there appears to be less 
and less reasoned deliberation in political discourse, as well as in voting patterns 
(which increasingly swing alternatively between elections and appear to be less 
stable). Political realists watching these events must wonder: what planet are 
the deliberative democracy theorists living on?115 
Deliberative democracy processes in very large groups, with very complex 
and divisive issues, cannot be casually assigned to such unstructured events as 
town-hall meetings. What was the purpose of those meetings? To learn what the 
public in its myriad views actually thought? To get new ideas from lay people 
about very complex financing, insurance, medical, and economic issues? Or to 
hope to round up popular support to discipline the recalcitrant Republicans? If 
this last possibility was the objective, on what planet were the Democratic 
strategists living on? Having appropriated mass-protest, demonstration, and 
disruptive tactics from one of the leading organizers of the Left in the 1960s,116 
the “other side” of the healthcare-reform issues then adapted these political 
strategies to the new Republican or Tea-Party populism, effectively subverting 
what town-hall planners had hoped would be more civil discourse. But did 
Democrats really hope and expect that civil discourse and one-way lectures or 
“information dumps” were going to lead to more approval of their already-
framed plans? Was the “hijacking” of the town halls really a subversion of truly 
deliberative processes, or were the disruptive tactics merely an “interruption” 
of a similarly nondeliberative one-way process? 
I am a registered Democrat (by party affiliation), and I am a democrat (in 
political and philosophical terms), as well as a dispute resolution professional 
who still believes we can facilitate deliberation of people’s different views and 
come to some understandings, even those with which we really disagree. When 
the stars align and the facilitators are really well qualified, we actually can make 
 
 114. Many criticize mediators for not dealing with emotions “appropriately,” however, often urging 
parties to move on to the future, without properly dealing with past feelings. See Trina Grillo, The 
Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1572–81 (1991) (discussing the 
role of emotion and anger in mediation); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, What Trina Taught Me: Reflections 
on Mediation, Inequality, Teaching and Life, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1413, 1420 (1997) (“[T]he reality [of 
mediation] is a tightly controlled ‘permitted’ discourse which constantly polices by reminding that 
‘anger is counterproductive’ to good solutions and long-term healthy relationships.”). See generally 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Remembrance of Things Past? The Relationship of Past to Future in Pursuing 
Justice in Mediation, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 97 (2004). 
 115. So some of those committed to truly deliberative processes, e.g., LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & 
JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING 
PUBLIC DISPUTES (1989), have now suggested a more radical overhaul of our entire political process. 
See SOL ERDMAN & LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, THE CURE FOR OUR BROKEN POLITICAL PROCESS: HOW 
WE CAN GET OUR POLITICIANS TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES TEARING OUR COUNTRY APART 27 (2008) 
(suggesting restructuring elections be based on votes for “best solutions” to particular problems and 
applied not only to congressional elections but to committee-selection processes in Congress and other 
deliberative bodies). 
 116. See ALINSKY, supra note 68 (providing strategies for progressive movements). 
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policy choices and decisions across party lines. But it is also clear that we need 
to be realists and, as any good facilitator knows, we must have a strategy in 
place to deal with those “difficult people” outliers, holdouts, and 
obstructionists. One way to do that is to take strongly held views and emotions 
seriously and begin to realize that we need all forms of discourse: principled 
reason, instrumental bargaining, and, in addition, feeling-based claims—
involving the recognition, if not acceptance, of the passions and emotions of 
others. 
We need to develop a theory of how to weave these three levels of discourse 
into large-scale and complex political issues. Small-group mediation, 
facilitation, and overly structured deliberative polling cannot simply be scaled 
up by the numbers. The numbers and structures matter. Howard Raiffa117 spent 
much of the last part of his career trying to understand at what breaking point 
the number of people present begins to affect the dynamics of decision making 
and facilitation. He studied how dangerous assumptions of prisoner’s dilemma 
games of “gotcha,” “defection,” and revenge-seeking (our current mode of 
political action) could be mitigated by other behavioral strategies.118 I have spent 
a large part of my career (as both a dispute resolution professional and feminist 
theorist) trying to recognize the importance of multiple value systems in any 
dispute resolution enterprise. If we are to scale up deliberative democracy, we 
must develop more sophisticated theories and practices with respect to both 
numbers and feelings. 
Perhaps the biggest challenge in all of this is to determine the appropriate 
goals of such sessions. One might use one strategy to simply inform people 
about what the government or some other subgroup or party is proposing and 
to seek their reactions and opinions. This can more effectively be done through 
other means—like representative political polling.119 If policy makers are 
actually interested in generating new solutions or ideas, then other forms of 
participatory democracy may be better suited to the function than a large and 
unruly meeting. This is where questions about substantive expertise and more 
popular or more democratic ideas can get messy. Some policy questions—
taxation, financing social-welfare programs, the stimulus package, climate 
change, and ideas about how to save or restart the economy—are very complex 
and require scientific, as well as value-based, choices and decisions. This is 
 
 117. One of my intellectual mentors. See RAIFFA, supra note 102. 
 118. Such as the prisoner’s dilemma computer game’s winning strategy of “tit for tat”: be trusting, 
reciprocal, defect only when defected against, and be forgiving to encourage learning. See ROBERT 
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27–54 (1984). 
 119. Not all polling is candidate or election based. Modern pollsters (like my husband!) are often 
the guardians of democratic information on issues and policy matters. National polling firms like 
Gallup, NYTimes/CBS, Pew, and the Kaiser Family Foundation have multiple methods for finding out 
what people think (and want) on many different policy issues. These scientific and random-selection 
polls can be used by legislators, policy groups, and, yes, interest groups; but the scientific ones (not 
“push polling”) actually give much more accurate and representative information about what people in 
any level of polity actually think than large, badly managed, “voluntary” group meetings like the town 
halls. 
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where the free-for-all of more open and fully participatory meetings differs 
significantly from Fishkin’s deliberative polling and Scandinavia’s study circles, 
where everyone is given information in advance of talking and deliberating. 
These events are more managed and are still based on notions of rational 
argument and discussion. 
Any major public decision on a major policy issue like healthcare, must also 
address political theory issues of whether direct or representative democracy will 
be the better approach. Many issues in American political history were, in fact, 
“decided” by more popular forms of direct action, if not direct voting—the end 
of the war in Vietnam, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Women’s 
Movement. All these began in well-organized and spontaneous mass actions 
fueling more direct participation in the polity. Some of these issues and their 
events had clear leaders (Martin Luther King Jr., Betty Friedan, and Gloria 
Steinem); others did not. But these important issues engaged more than merely 
rational thinking, argument, and reasoned persuasion. Martin Luther King Jr. 
used biblical, religious, and ethical appeals; the Women’s Movement used anger 
and changed social mores (on such issues as childrearing, divorce, reproduction, 
and women’s employment); the antiwar movement even used some physical 
violence (draft-card burning, protests before draft boards120). So we know that 
engaged and participatory politics uses more than argument, reason, and voting. 
“Realistic philosophers” like Sen have urged us to use more broadly 
discovered and more diverse narratives, stories, histories, and data to assess 
different ways of hearing about and then evaluating particular policy choices. 
Skilled public-policy facilitators like Larry Susskind have successfully mediated 
important policy choices in budget allocations, environmental siting, natural-
resource utilization (including large-scale global agreements and treaties121), and 
even highly conflictual value disputes like “faith-based” social and public 
assistance, animal rights, and abortion-clinic-access rights.122 Listening to stories, 
brainstorming alternatives, and finding out what people really value engages all 
three “senses” involved: reasoned argument (the mind), bargaining and trading 
(the gut—what we can “stomach” to get what we want from and with others), 
and our emotional and value-based commitments (the heart). To use all these 
discourses productively in political debate on highly contested issues requires 
more structure, more variation in ways of managing political communication 
(“process pluralism”), and more trust between and among the parties than we 
currently seem able to muster. 
 
 120. Including the bloody activity of the Catonsville Nine and the brothers Berrigan (priests) in 
protesting military action and mandatory military service in an “unjust war.” 
 121. See generally INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY MAKING (Lawrence E. Susskind et 
al. eds., 1992); ENGAGING COUNTRIES AND STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 2000). 
 122. For case studies on some successful mediations, see generally THE CONSENSUS BUILDING 
HANDBOOK, supra note 11. 
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So pick your next politically divisive issue in healthcare (abortion, stem-cell 
research, end-of-life decision making) or politics (the conduct-of-war policy, 
prison policy, economic policy), and imagine what kind of structure for 
conversation we would need in order to really hear all sides and to truly 
deliberate and learn from others who feel and think and reason differently than 
we do.123 And then think about what facts are needed to understand these issues 
(for example, what science, medicine, economics, behavioral and cognitive 
psychology, and sociology must be introduced and understood by the 
deliberators). Then think about the ways in which what we think and feel can 
affect (and distort) how we process information, form opinions, and come to 
our ultimate conclusions. And, finally, even if we could design a truly 
deliberative conversation on these and other complex issues, consider how our 
system eventually turns most of these questions into simplistic on or off, yes or 
no decisions in a two-party system requiring either majority or super-majority 
votes.124 Are deliberative democracy, wise decision making, and good policy 
choices even possible in such a polarized and binary world? Our healthcare 
debates don’t provide much optimism.125 Rather, the recent town-hall meetings 
make clear that our efforts to scale up deliberative democracy in dispute 
resolution remain a work in progress.126 
 
 
 123. As I write this, President Hamid Karzai and the Taliban are in negotiations about ending the 
war in Afghanistan. Karen DeYoung et al., Taliban in High-Level Talks with Karzai Government, 
Sources Say, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2010/10/05/AR2010100506249.html. 
 124. Many political matters, like school financing, taxation, and constitutional amendments, require 
more than a simple majority, either of a legislature or in a referendum process. 
 125. Especially now, as the recently passed Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is being 
attacked in the courts as an unconstitutional mandate, further polarizing the discussion. Two lower 
courts have held the Act to be unconstitutional. See Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 
2010 WL 2000518 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2010); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598 
(E.D. Va. 2010). And several courts have upheld the Act, against constitutional attacks. See Thomas 
More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010); Mead v. Holder, 2011 WL 611139 
(D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011). See generally Randy Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual 
Health Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581 (2011) (concluding that the 
Act’s individual mandate—requiring all persons to purchase private health insurance—is 
unconstitutional under existing Supreme Court doctrine on the Commerce and Necessary and Proper 
Clauses and the tax power). 
 126. For more views on the current role of deliberative democracy in dispute resolution, see 
generally Hiro N. Aragaki, Deliberative Democracy as Dispute Resolution? Conflict, Interests and 
Reasons, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 407 (2009); Amy J. Cohen, Dispute Systems Design, 
Neoliberalism, and the Problem of Scale, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 51 (2009); Sandy Heirbacher, 
Upgrading the Way We Do Politics, YES!, Aug. 21, 2009, available at http://www.yesmagazine.org/ 
democracy/upgrading-the-way-we-do-politics. 
